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ESSAY REVIEW
RENAISSANCE ARISTOTELIANISM 
AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION
Marco Sgarbi*
Università Ca’ Foscari ‒ Venezia
1. Historiographical Biases
David Wootton’s The Invention of  Science. A New History of  the Scientific Revo-
lution 1 is the most significant work on the Scientific Revolution since the publi-
cation of  Steven Shapin’s The Scientific Revolution in 1996. However, whereas for 
Shapin “there was no such thing as the Scientific Revolution,” that is “a coherent, 
cataclysmic, and climatic event that fundamentally and irrevocably changed what 
people knew about the natural world and how they secured proper knowledge of  
that world,” 2 for Wootton not only was there a Scientific Revolution, but it “was a 
single transformative process […] of  several distinct types of  change overlapping 
and interlocking with each other.” 3 
The two theses, like their methodologies, are opposites. Wootton’s book is 
written against the historiographical approach advocated by Shapin, and with 
him Simon Schaffer, Nick Wilding and many others generally characterized as 
relativist historians. A relativist approach would render “the Scientific Revolu-
tion totally invisible,” 4 and science entirely, purely and simply a “social construc-
* Marco Sgarbi, Department of  Philosophy and Cultural Heritage, Ca’ Foscari Universi-
ty, Malcanton Marcorà, Dorsoduro 3246, Venice, Italy – marco.sgarbi@unive.it. This research 
has been possible thanks to the ERC Starting Grant 2013, n. 335949, “Aristotle in the Italian 
Vernacular: Rethinking Renaissance and Early-Modern Intellectual History (c. 1400-c. 1650)”. 
1 London, Allen Lane, 2015. Hereafter, referenced in abbreviated form (W), followed by 
page numbers.
2 S. Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, Chicago, The University of  Chicago Press, 1996, p. 1.
3 W, 566.
4 W, 591.
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tion.” 5 Wootton views his own position as constructivist rather than relativist, 
however, because “science, as a method and practice, is a social construct […] 
but science as a system of  knowledge is more than a social construct because 
it is successful, because it fits with reality.” 6 In this manner Wootton distances 
himself  f rom those historians of  science who question the existence of  a sin-
gle and uniform intellectual movement called “the Scientific Revolution,” of  an 
entity called “modern science,” and of  a method that can truly be considered 
“scientific.” He believes in each one of  these conceptions, but he does share with 
these historians some fundamental ideas that sometimes seem to undermine his 
historical narrative. 
Almost all histories of  science of  the period between 1500 and 1700 are found-
ed upon two closely interlinked historiographical assumptions. The first is that 
the great advancements in science happened mainly in the seventeenth centu-
ry in opposition to a stagnating Medieval and Renaissance thought. The second 
assumption is that such developments were possible within an anti-Aristotelian 
movement. As a matter of  fact, Wootton embraces these historiographical biases: 
he explicitly writes that “modern science was invented between 1572, when Tycho 
Brahe saw a nova, or new star, and 1704, when Newton published his Opticks.” 
Moreover, his book presents numerous statements according to which the Scien-
tific Revolution was a revolt against Aristotelianism. 
There are at least three reasons for the origin of  these biases. The first is that 
historians have all too frequently given credence to the self-proclaimed novelty and 
anti-Aristotelianism of  the so-called moderns, who are in fact known to historiog-
raphy as novatores. Already from the titles of  their works one senses the wind of  
change that appears to characterize a decisive programmatic turning away from 
the past, f rom the Aristotelian tradition especially.7 Both the constructivist Woot-
ton that the relativist Shapin, like many others, agree on this aspect. How much 
these self-declarations of  originality correspond to the truth or in fact constitute a 
case of  blatant self-deception and cultural propaganda is an open debate.8 Often in 
the history of  thought, philosophers and scientists have declared themselves to be 
revolutionaries or subverters of  the status quo in order to establish their ideas, exalt 
their genius and disseminate their thought. Is it possible to rely on these claims of  
novelty and anti-Aristotelianism, or are we in fact misinformed by the moderns? 
Clearly one cannot question the existence of  the scientific discoveries of  the time, 
5 W, 517. On these characters of  post-modern history of  science, cf. H. Floris Cohen, 
The Scientific Revolution. An Historiographical Inquiry, Chicago, The University of  Chicago Press, 
1994, pp. 151-152; L. Daston, K. Park, Introduction, in The Cambridge History of  Science. Volume 3. 
Early Modern Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 12-13.
6 W, 540.
7 Cf. L. Thorndike, Newness and Craving for Novelty in Seventeenth-Century Science and Med-
icine, «Journal of  the History of  Ideas», 4, 1951, pp. 584-598.
8 Cf. E. Panofsky, “Renaissance” ‒ Self-Definition or Self-Deception?, in Renaissance and Renas-
cences in Western Art, New York, Harper&Row, 1972, pp. 1-41.
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which were real and had a huge impact on the history of  science. What one must 
ask is whether these findings and their impact were truly revolutionary. Some 
doubt may be raised reading the historiographical reconstructions of  the period. 
Generally, authors like Galilei were seen as novatores, but this appellation did not 
necessarily have the positive connotations it enjoys today. Historian Daniel Georg 
Morhof, for instance, wrote in his Polyhistor (1688) that most of  the moderns 
[…] attempted a rebellion and strove to conquer the tyranny of  the Peripatetics. […] In 
addition these innovators do not share the same genius; some of  them are mad in their 
reasoning, some are entirely inept and have introduced nothing new into philosophy apart 
from various terminologies […]. The quest for a little fame obsessed many, but only a few 
were led by the study of  truth.9
Fame and glory, more than the truth, moved according to Morhof  these no-
vatores to criticize Aristotelianism. Emphasizing the original character of  their re-
search would not have been instrumental to the quest for the truth in opposition 
to the falsities of  the ancients, rather it would have been a symptom of  the sense 
of  rivalry and competitiveness among colleagues racing to unearth new discover-
ies that could be remembered in the annals of  the history of  science. Of  course, 
even Morhof ’s testimony cannot be taken as absolute truth, but it is evidence of  a 
different feeling towards developments of  science in those years. 
This self-portrait of  the moderns as anti-Aristotelian philosophers and sci-
entists led the twentieth-century historiographical research not only to consider 
the alleged Scientific Revolution as a reaction against Aristotelianism, but also to 
neglect the study of  Aristotelianism itself  within the intellectual framework in 
which to understand the innovations and discoveries of  the “new science.” This 
is the second main reason for the historiographical biases. Even those who dealt 
with Renaissance Aristotelianism and its relation to modern science in a highly 
sophisticated way denied any influence of  the former on the latter.10 These stud-
ies, however, focus mainly on Aristotelianism in the universities, where professors 
were obliged to teach the Aristotelian thought according to specific canons and 
standards, and for this reason scholars have always thought that the Aristotelian 
culture in the Renaissance was stagnant. 
If  one looks at the fortune of  the Aristotelian tradition beyond universities 
and ecclesiastic schools,11 it is possible to find a more vibrant culture that is open 
to the new scientific and technical discoveries. It is no coincidence, therefore, that 
two of  the most original and innovative Aristotelians mentioned by Wootton, 
Alessandro Piccolomini and Leonardo Garzoni, worked mainly outside the uni-
9 D. Morhof, Polyhistor Literarius, Philosophicus et Practicus, Lübeck, Böckmann, 1688, 
p. 108. 
10 Cf. Ch. B. Schmitt, Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of  Zabarella’s View with Ga-
lileo’s in De Motu, «Studies in the Renaissance», 16, 1969, pp. 80-138.
11 D. A. Lines, Beyond Latin in Renaissance Philosophy: A Plea for New Critical Perspectives, 
«Intellectual History Review», 25, 2015, pp. 373-389.
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versity and wrote in the vernacular. How the anti-Aristotelian paradigm oper-
ates in Wootton’s research is clear in Garzoni’s case. Garzoni is a real puzzle for 
Wootton. While recognizing that Garzoni’s treatises “are the first major work 
of  modern experimental science,” Wootton adds that the inventor of  the new 
magnetic science was actually Gilbert, not Garzoni. Indeed, in this specific case, 
“chronology is misleading” because “for crucial respects [Garzoni’s treatises] are 
simply a continuation of  the erratic medieval tradition of  experimentation […] 
their conceptual apparatus is Aristotelian, and they seek to address a gap or anom-
aly in the Aristotelian scheme of  knowledge.” 12 But why, instead of  excluding 
Garzoni from the narrative of  the Scientific Revolution or from the developments 
of  “modern science” just because he was Aristotelian, do we not try to include 
him and imagine that even these atypical Aristotelians might have made signifi-
cant contributions to the advancement of  knowledge? In general, as in this case, 
historiography has dealt only sporadically with these forms of  philosophy and 
science, not to mention this Aristotelianism,13 focusing rather on the novatores 
of  philosophy like Bernardino Telesio, Giordano Bruno, Tommaso Campanella 
and others, but there is a whole other underground world to be explored that it 
is coming to light as we speak and promises, at least in part, to shed new light on 
developments in science. 
The third reason, only recently recognized,14 is that, when one speaks of  Sci-
entific Revolution in general one is dealing with the substitution of  one culture 
with another: the philosophy of  the novatores that takes over from Aristotelian 
philosophy, and “modern science” that replaces Aristotelian scientia.15 As we have 
already mentioned, the majority of  the histories of  philosophy and science, like 
Wootton’s, were written following this paradigm.16 Nowadays, thanks to Daniel 
Garber’s meticulous clarifications, we know that it is no longer so: neither Bacon’s 
experimental philosophy nor Galilei’s mathematicism, Descartes’s mechanicism 
or even Newton’s physics were capable of  establishing themselves globally and 
supplant Aristotelianism. We can therefore reasonably argue that “the diversity 
12 W, 328.
13 Cf. L. Olschki, Geschichte der neusprachlichen wissenschaftlichen Literatur. Bildung und Wis-
senschaft im Zeitalter der Renaissance, Leipzig-Florence-Rome-Geneva, Olschki, 1922; S. Caroti, 
L’“Aristotele italiano” di Alessandro Piccolomini: un progetto sistematico di filosofia naturale in volgare 
a metà ‘500, in A. Calzona, F. P. Fiore, A. Tenenti, C. Vasoli (eds.), Il volgare come lingua di cul-
tura dal Trecento al Cinquecento, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 2003, pp. 361-401.
14 D. Garber, Galileo, Newton and All That: If  It Wasn’t a Scientific Revolution, What Was 
It? (A Manifesto), «Circumscribere. International Journal for the History of  Science», 7, 2009, 
pp. 9-18; D. Garber, Why the Scientific Revolution Wasn’t a Scientific Revolution, and Why It Mat-
ters, in R. Richards, L. Daston (eds.), Kuhn’s Structure of  Scientific Revolutions at Fifty, Chicago, 
University of  Chicago Press, 2016, pp. 133-148.
15 Cf. Scientia, in J. Kraye, G. A. Rogers, T. Sorell (eds.), Early Modern Philosophy Sev-
enteenth-Century Thinkers on Demonstrative Knowledge from First Principles, Dordrecht, Springer, 
2010.
16 W, 24-25.
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of  alternative anti-Aristotelian programs that blossomed in the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries never completely sorted itself  out in a single alterna-
tive to the Aristotelian program, nothing that could be called the new science.” 17 
Perhaps it would be more appropriate to focus on the transmission, modification 
and exploitation of  the Aristotelian tradition within an intellectual framework in 
continuous change and evolution, such as early modernity was. 
Besides all these general historiographical biases, there are many that are 
more detailed and just as pervasive. One of  them concerns the origin of  the 
Scientific Revolution. It is traced back to Galileo Galilei, who has the merit of  
(1) having fought dogmatic Aristotelianism; (2) having founded mechanics; (3) 
having applied mathematics to the study of  natural phenomena; (4) having pro-
vided indisputable evidence for the validity of  Copernicus’ heliocentric theory 
with the discovery of  Venus’s phases; (5) having reconciled celestial and terres-
trial physics with his numerous astronomical observations. Here, too, Wootton 
remains faithful to the historiographical tradition and sees Galilei as the great 
revolutionary.18 
This historical picture of  Galilei is nowadays contested and must be revised. 
There is a growing demand among scholars for a greater contextualization of  his 
thought to allow the hidden traces of  shared knowledge to be reconstructed and 
thereby the originality of  his thinking and the scale of  his contribution to the new 
discoveries to be recognized in a more truthful manner,19 beyond the facile procla-
mations of  the propagandists. However, “even today the fact that the young Gali-
leo composed a number of  Aristotelian treatises is often considered as merely the 
excusable lapse of  an immature scientist.” 20 Not only, historiography tends “to 
portray medieval Aristotelian scholasticism merely as the counter position against 
which Galileo’s theory of  motion gained its profile as new science, neglecting the 
potential of  Aristotelianism as a generic knowledge resource available to Galileo 
and his contemporaries.” 21 It misconstrues the idea that “any attempt to create 
a theory of  nature as general as Aristotelian physics has to start from this basic 
body of  knowledge, even if  its goal is to revise the Aristotelian system.” 22 The Ar-
istotelianism and the intellectual background from which the stories of  scientists 
like Galilei emerged should not be considered an obstacle to be overcome, rather 
fertile soil for new discoveries. Indeed, of  Galilei’s Aristotelian background or his 
role as an astrologer following in the footsteps of  a long Medieval and Renaissance 
17 D. Garber, Why the Scientific Revolution Wasn’t a Scientific Revolution, and Why It Matters, 
cit., p. 142.
18 W, 214-222, 224-228.
19 J. Büttner, P. Damerow, J. Renn, Traces of  an Invisible Giant: Shared Knowledge in Gali-
leo’s Unpublished Treatises, in Largo campo di filosofare: Eurosymposium Galileo 2001, Orotava, Fun-
dación Canaria Orotava de Historia de la Ciencia, 2001, pp. 183-201.
20 Ibid., p. 188.
21 Ibid., p. 190.
22 Ibid., p. 189.
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tradition,23 there are no traces in Wootton’s book. Nor could there be any trace, 
in fact, because the whole of  his book “is an argument against the continuity the-
sis.” 24 If  one aims to defend the existence of  a revolution in science, one cannot 
at the same time support the continuity thesis. It is true, as Wootton says, that 
continuity thesis in historiography tends to underestimate the subject under ex-
amination, resizing it to fit within its historical and intellectual context, but it is 
through the re-contextualization of  the alleged “Scientific Revolution” that one 
can appreciate even the smallest contributions to the advancement of  knowledge 
between 1500 and 1700. 
Many questions arise. Can one truly call “revolution” something that hap-
pened over a period of  more than a hundred years? Wootton gives a positive an-
swer: “between 1600 and 1733 (or so – the process was more advanced in England 
than elsewhere) the intellectual world of  the educated elite changed more rapidly 
than at any time in previous history.” 25 For this reason we had a revolution. If  so, 
however, can one still legitimately call a process that concerns a clique, a small 
circle of  intellectuals, a “revolution”? The investigations of  cultural history have 
shown that between 1500 and 1800 there was no substantial change in the popular 
culture of  the ordinary people, that is for the whole non-elite. Hence, even if  one 
could admit the existence of  a revolution in science, the question should be how 
much was it revolutionary and for who?
What we have pointed to so far should not be considered real weaknesses, 
rather the flattening of  a historiographical trend more committed to dwelling on 
methodological debates and writing new historical narratives with old material, 
rather than uncovering new historical data. Wootton, however, develops an orig-
inal methodology that constitutes the most significant aspect of  his important 
research. His novelty consists in looking for the revolution in language that must 
have accompanied the revolution in science: “the revolution in language is indeed 
the best evidence that there really was a revolution in science.” In other words, 
what one should look for is the emergence of  new languages, because “they rep-
resent transformations in what people can think and how they can conceptualize 
their world.” 26 With transformations of  language he means not only the intro-
duction of  new words, but also new meanings acquired by old terms which are 
often unrelated to the original meanings. This argues in favour of  a discontinuist 
approach. If  new words and new meanings are found, the reason is that most of  
the time they designate new things or new ways of  thinking. 
This approach to the history of  science through the history of  words has 
proved fruitful, and Wootton applies it to almost seventeen chapters of  his book. 
23 Among the various works cf. H. D. Rutkin, Galileo Astrologer: Astrology and Mathematical 
Practice in the Late-Sixteenth and Early-Seventeenth Centuries, «Galileana», 2, 2005, pp. 107-143.
24 W, 573.
25 W, 11.
26 W, 48-49.
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At times Wootton strays from the history of  the words to the history of  concepts. 
In dealing with the term “evidence,” for example, he writes that “it would be 
wrong, however, to concentrate solely on the word ‘evidence’ rather than the 
concept which it expresses, for if  we do so we will miss a crucial development.” 27 
This shift f rom words to concepts occurs frequently and speaks more in favour 
of  continuity than discontinuity. While the introduction of  a new word can be 
documented through a more or less exhaustive census of  lexicographical reper-
tories, the concept behind the word can be traced back as far as the imagination 
of  the historian can find relevant similarities or analogies. A revolution is there-
fore much harder to determine through concepts than through words, hence the 
lexicographical approach would seem better suited to the purpose. There is little 
doubt that this vein of  inquiry shall be further explored in the near future.
2. Mathematization and Constructivism
Joseph Glanvill summarizes the key idea of  Wootton’s book: “The Aristote-
lian Philosophy is inept for New discoveries […] There is an America of  secrets 
and [an] unknown Peru of  Nature.” 28 This sentence on the one hand character-
izes the anti-Aristotelianism which imbues the “modern science,” while on the 
other it connects the new concept of  “scientific discovery” to recent geographical 
discoveries, a connection without which, according to Wootton, there would have 
been no revolution at all. 
The discovery of  America opened up a whole new world for science, and 
Wootton in fact devotes an entire chapter to the word and concept of  “discovery.” 
Prior to 1492, “the primary objective of  Renaissance intellectuals was to recover 
the lost culture of  the past, not to establish new knowledge of  their own […] 
there was no such thing as new knowledge. What looked like new knowledge 
was, consequently, simply old knowledge which had been mislaid, and history was 
assumed to go round in circles.” 29 By means of  semantic study of  the use of  the 
word “discovery,” however, Wootton shows how it assumes a new meaning and 
becomes a metascientific idea. One can say that “discovery” constitutes the true 
“transcendental” of  science, it “is the crucial precondition for systematic innova-
tion in the knowledge of  nature,” and in fact there cannot be a logic of  innovation 
without first assuming the concept of  “discovery.” The instatement of  “discovery” 
as a culturally and socially shared idea made it possible for the process of  inno-
vation to be recognized and understood as a positive value in opposition to au-
thority. It was thanks to the new geographic discoveries that for the first time the 
empirical data, or experience, could confute previously established knowledge. 
27 W, 419. The same is said about the “fact”, cf. W, 297.
28 W, 39.
29 W, 73-74.
336 MARCO SGARBI
The discovery of  America, for instance, showed clearly and empirically that life 
at the tropics was possible, in direct opposition to the view propounded by Ar-
istotle.30 This silent revolution, more than the Copernican theory, produced the 
kind of  crisis in the Aristotelian cosmology that later led Tycho Brahe (1572) and 
Giordano Bruno (1584) to defend, respectively, the corruptibility of  the heavens 
and the infinity of  the universe. 
The introduction of  the idea of  “discovery” in the early modern conceptual 
framework is one of  the two major causes that triggered the process of  the Sci-
entific Revolution. The second is the so-called mathematization of  the sublunary 
world, which started with Leon Battista Alberti.31 Wootton writes that “the seven-
teenth-century mathematization of  the world was long in preparation,” and that 
“perspective painting, ballistics, fortification, cartography and navigation prepared 
the ground for Galileo, Descartes and Newton.” 32 Indeed, there is a continuous 
line that connects Alberti with Galilei, passing through Leonardo Da Vinci and 
Niccolò Tartaglia. To start with, each one of  these authors was an engineer who 
developed his theories in close liaison with artisans. More importantly, however, 
according to Wootton, all these intellectuals supported the view that mathematics 
could aspire to the highest degree of  certainty because it considered the math-
ematical and geometrical forms without matter, that is without the accidental 
component. 
Historians of  science from Alexandre Koyré and Ernst Cassirer have always 
maintained that this conception involved an adherence to some particular kind of  
Platonism. Yet this notion is the central idea of  Aristotle’s second book of  the Met-
aphysics, where he states that since the subject of  physics is matter, namely some-
thing accidental, it cannot aspire to the highest degree of  certainty and precision 
of  mathematics. It is important to focus on this point because the persistent idea 
of  a Platonic perspective has often led historians to the simplistic assumption that 
anyone who trusts mathematics is Platonic and therefore anti-Aristotelian. But the 
inference is not so direct and explicit. He who “spoke in praise of  the mathemati-
cal sciences” not always “praised them by denigrating the Aristotelian philosophy 
taught in the universities,” as Wootton writes in Regiomontanus’s case. 
There are plenty of  cases in the Renaissance in which Aristotelianism was 
more or less combined with mathematics. Some examples are Nicolò Tartaglia, 
Alessandro Piccolomini, Pietro Catena and others who produced highly influen-
tial works in which Aristotelian physics was described through mathematical tools 
and Peripatetic conceptuality, logic and ideas were seen as complementary to the 
mathematical investigation. Of  course, one can doubt that these mathematicians 
were “truly” Aristotelian, but Tartaglia discusses, comments and partially trans-
lates the pseudo-Aristotelian mechanics, Piccolomini is arguably the most impor-
30 W, 136.
31 W, 200.
32 W, 209.
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tant vulgarizer of  Aristotle in the Renaissance and Catena wrote a work on the 
identity between Aristotelian logic and mathematical reasoning. They diverge in 
some points from Aristotle, but they do not stand outside the long history of  the 
Aristotelian tradition. The Renaissance mathematical movement cannot be pre-
sented as anti-Aristotelian without qualification.
In the central part of  his book, Wootton deals with the constituent elements 
of  the Scientific Revolution which purportedly contributed to the substitution of  
a new world of  quantity for the Aristotelian world of  qualities: f rom causes and 
essences to “facts,” “experiments,” “laws,” “hypotheses/theories,” “evidence and 
judgement.” In Wootton’s view, the “facts” represent a new way of  knowledge 
grounded in experience, and must be distinguished from the phenomena inves-
tigated by the old philosophy. Facts refer to evidence and explain how a thing is, 
while phenomena refer to a cause and explain why a thing is. Herein lies the key 
difference between the Aristotelian scientia and the “modern science.” This dis-
tinction reflects the difference between the Latin term “factum” and the English 
term “fact”: “a factum requires an agent, a fact does not.” 33 In other words, to 
know a factum one needs to know the causes, whereas the knowledge of  the cause 
is not necessary to know a “fact.” Thus, following Knelem Digby, Wootton states 
that “we can establish ‘the verity of  the fact’ […] without having knowledge of  
the cause.” 34 The new science focuses on facts because they set the standards “for 
judging the reliability of  testimony,” in particular the testimony of  experience 
against authority.
However, Wootton’s methodology of  the history of  language also leads to 
the discovery of  a number of  exceptions in the early modern age in which the 
“fact” coincides with something done or made, that is something that refers to an 
agent, to the point that he is compelled to admit that the word “fact” in its modern 
sense, that is without the reference to the agent, “becomes respectable in English 
only after 1661.” 35 In this context, he abandons his methodological approach and 
states that “the words are one thing, the concepts are another. The word fact tells 
us very little about the establishing and refuting of  facts.” 36 Beyond words there 
is something more, the concept, which should in fact determine the victory of  
the “fact” without agent. Indeed, in Wootton’s historical narrative, if  one does 
not acknowledge the distinction between the factum and the fact, one cannot un-
derstand why the fact became so important for modern science, why it deals with 
experience and why it led to a new epistemology that characterizes a revolution-
ary movement against the Aristotelian theory of  knowledge. Also in this case the 
break with tradition and the opposition to Aristotelianism seem to be too strong, 
and the willingness to distinguish the fact from the factum prevents recognition 
33 W, 284.
34 W, 287.
35 W, 297.
36 W, 297.
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of  the various dynamics at work in the broadest cultural context from which the 
alleged Scientific Revolution is thought to emerge. 
In the De antiquissima Italiorum sapientia, Giambattista Vico offers another re-
liable reconstruction of  the instatement of  the “fact” in the “modern science.” As 
Vico reminds us, the Latins and Scholastics identified the verum with the factum 
in Wootton’s sense, that is something that is made. This identification is possible 
because the agent of  the factum knows all the causes, and to know the causes 
means to know the truth. Therefore, for the maker, verum and factum coincide. 
It is clear, then, that knowledge of  truth pertains only to God, who made and 
created all things, while the human mind can know only some elements, and even 
then by analogy. Therefore, Vico writes, when the human being investigates the 
nature of  things, it becomes aware of  the impossibility of  grasping the essences 
because it does not know how things are constituted, and becomes conscious of  
the limits of  the mind. Instead of  falling into a pessimistic scepticism, the human 
being exploits this weakness of  the mind, and “by abstraction […] feigns a world 
of  numbers and forms, which would embrace in itself  the universe.” 37 Thus “the 
physicist, being incapable of  defining the things according to the truth, that is by 
attributing to each thing its nature and making it actually (this is possible for God, 
but impossible for man)” – because it does not know certainly “the elements from 
which the things receive existence” – it “has begotten two sciences that are most 
useful to society – arithmetic and geometry – and from these, in turn, it has begot-
ten mechanics, the parent of  all the arts necessary to mankind.” 38 Therefore, Vico 
explains, “human science is born of  a defect of  the mind ‒ namely, of  its extreme 
littleness ‒ in consequence of  which it is external to all things, contains nothing 
of  what is desires to know, and so cannot produce the truth which it seeks to as-
certain.” On the contrary, “the most certain sciences are those which expiate the 
defect in why they originate, and which resemble divine science by the creative 
activity which they involve.” 39 Vico’s story shows that the culture of  facts within 
science is born when the products of  the mind, the facta, have been used not only 
as tools for reading reality, but when they have been conceived, by analogy, as con-
stituent elements of  reality itself  and of  the nature of  things. 
Vico’s historical reconstruction acknowledges the importance of  the mathe-
matization of  the world maintained by Wootton and others without resorting to 
some artificial and labile distinction – at least from the standpoint of  the history 
of  the term – between the fact without agent and the factum with agent. At the 
core of  this conception, according to which one knows what it makes, there is the 
idea that the human being cannot directly know the truth. This perspective has 
established itself  in opposition to Platonism and Scholasticism and in line with 
37 G. Vico, De Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia, translated by L. M. Palmer, Ithaca-London, 
Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 47. Translation revised.
38 Ibid., p. 52.
39 Ibid.
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the new Renaissance naturalistic Aristotelianism, especially that inaugurated by 
Pietro Pomponazzi. It is a well-known fact that in his De immortalitate animae Pom-
ponazzi denies human beings the theoretical capacity through which the mind 
can know the causes, the principles and the essences of  nature and of  things. Only 
very few human beings can acquire this kind of  contemplative and speculative 
knowledge. This led to the conclusion that the proper dimension of  the human 
being is the practical one, that of  morals and actions: human beings know what 
they do because the principle of  action is in themselves and thus they know all 
the cause of  the “facts” that they made. Reflection on the narrow intellectual ca-
pacities of  the mind triggered a series of  considerations on what the life and the 
activity proper to the human being were. In general, Platonics and Scholastics still 
believed that the proper activity of  the human being was theoretical, while many 
Aristotelians started to think that the proper activity was practical, thus open-
ing the question about what the mind could know. For instance the Aristotelian 
Sperone Speroni, in his Dialogo della vita attiva e contemplativa (1542), states that it 
is hard to have an insight into the essence of  things and that the mind acquires a 
more precise and truthful knowledge by considering only how things happen in 
the world or how they are made.40 For Speroni to recognize the narrowness of  the 
human mind does not mean to defend a sceptical attitude, which promoted the 
idea of  the vanity of  knowledge. Rather this acknowledgement led to the elab-
oration of  supplementary and corrective tools for the mind. Among these, not 
surprisingly, Speroni mentions mathematical sciences and in particular geometry. 
The emphasis on the limited capacity of  mind within Aristotelianism, espe-
cially its vernacular embodiment, generated almost a total disinterest towards 
metaphysics, focusing rather on natural and moral philosophy. Also within these 
two branches of  philosophy we can recognize a predisposition towards disciplines 
dealing with facts. For instance, in the field of  natural philosophy, we can find 
copious works concerning mechanics, namely ballistics, the science of  weights 
or fortifications, etc., that is disciplines useful for engineers, soldiers, architects, 
and artisans.41 We also find great interest in meteorology,42 that is the science of  
floods, tides, fires, earthquakes, etc., which provided immediately applicable no-
tions for understanding nature which could prove decisive in agriculture or open-
sea voyages. In the field of  moral philosophy, we see the production of  a number 
of  works on ethical and political precepts, in particular on how to instruct soldiers, 
leaders and princes or on how to command people or armies.43 
40 Cf. S. Speroni, Opere, Venice, Occhi, 1740, vol. 2, p. 496. 
41 Cf. M. Sgarbi, Aristotele per artigiani, ingegneri e architetti, «Philosophical Readings», 2, 
2016, pp. 67-78.
42 Cf. C. Martin, Meteorology for Courtiers and Ladies: Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renais-
sance Italy, «Philosophical Readings», 2, 2012, pp. 3-14. 
43 This kind of  explanation is not typical only of  natural philosophy, but also of  ethics 
and politics. The most famous case is Nicolò Machiavelli, who does not aim to give a causal 
explanation of  which is the best political model, rather it is more important for him to explain 
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The focus of  these disciplines was not on the discovery of  the why or of  the 
essence of  natural or human nature, because this knowledge was not proper or at 
least possible to human beings, rather on the how. The search for the “how” rather 
than the “why” allowed an immediate applicability of  knowledge that rarely could 
be achieved by means of  a mere metaphysical survey of  essence.
Tartaglia is a case in point. His obsessive focus on the solution, by means 
of  mathematics, of  practical problems common among artisans, engineers and 
architects, led to a simple description of  the physical phenomena.44 The most im-
portant aspect was to explain how phenomena happened and from these descrip-
tions how to formulate useful laws to test and replicate the phenomena. Equally 
emblematic is the case of  Galileo Galilei, who at the very beginning of  his career 
aimed to solve practical problems related to the scale, floating bodies and tides. 
Later he applied mathematics to the whole universe in his Dialogo sopra i massimi 
sistemi del mondo and the terrestrial physical phenomena in the Discorsi sopra due 
nuove scienze, and in so doing founded modern mechanics. 
The immediate consequence of  the mathematization of  the world, that is the 
world is made of  “facts” understood as mathematical facta and therefore perfectly 
understandable by the human mind, is that knowing and operating are converti-
ble, that is what one knows, one can do or make. The result is thus the application 
of  known causes to produce effects in order to test the validity of  the acquired 
knowledge. This led to another central claim of  Wootton’s book, that is the strict 
relationship between the fact and the experiment. The experiment is the simplest 
way of  making strange facts plainer,45 because if  one can replicate the fact, this 
means that the causes of  this fact are known and that the fact itself  can be under-
stood in the ordinary course of  nature: the fact is no longer a strange fact but a 
plainer fact. 
In other words, “the experiment is an artefact,” 46 in the sense that it is factum 
with an agent and for this reason the experiment can be understood as a reliable 
guide to how nature works. According to Wootton, Bacon was “the first person to 
insist as a matter of  principle that knowledge of  artefacts could count as knowl-
edge of  nature.” 47 But William R. Newman and Perez Zagorin have shown that in 
Bacon there is no explicit endorsement of  the theory of  a maker’s knowledge or 
of  a constructivist principle.48 The reason is simple: despite a sophisticated knowl-
things as they are and how they are. Cf. N. Machiavelli, The Prince, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p. 5. 
44 Cf. M. J. Henninger-Voss, How the ‘New Science’ of  Cannons Shook up the Aristotelian 
Cosmos, «Journal of  the History of  Ideas», 63, 2002, pp. 371-397.
45 W, 300.
46 W, 322. 
47 W, 323. 
48 P. Zagorin, Francis Bacon, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 38-39; W. R. 
Newman, Promethean Ambition. Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature, Chicago, The University 
of  Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 34-114. Antonio Pérez-Ramos himself  admits that the Lord Chan-
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edge of  mechanics, Bacon was not proficient in mathematics. Only the descriptive 
tool of  mathematics applied to natural philosophy and mechanics, now consti-
tuting one single science and not two separate disciplines, could demolish the 
distinction between art and nature, preternatural and natural. 
Even if  Bacon was not the revolutionary, Wootton’s general claim that the dis-
tinction between art and nature collapsed after the mathematization of  the world 
is more than plausible. However, it would be wrong to interpret this process of  
mathematization as a rehabilitation of  Pythagorism or Platonism,49 because if  it 
is true that for these two philosophical movements numbers and mathematical 
entities represented the immutable forms that constituted the world, it is also true 
that they were mere objects of  contemplation, a contemplation that from the 
sixteenth century onwards was doubly denied by the acknowledgement of  the 
narrow capacities of  the mind and the pragmatic value of  knowledge. 
At the same time, however, the fact is never merely empirical or accidental, 
but it must be a factum, otherwise its understandability would escape the con-
trol of  the scientific laws, which are necessary to govern nature in a pragmatic 
perspective of  knowledge. Amos Funkenstein was right when he stated that the 
“study of  nature in the seventeenth century was neither predominantly idealis-
tic nor empirical. It was first and foremost constructive, pragmatic in the radical 
sense. It would lead to the conviction that only the doable – at least in principle – is 
also understandable: verum et factum convertuntur.”50 
Thus “a new ideal of  knowledge was born – the idea of  knowledge-by-do-
ing, or knowledge by construction.” 51 A merely idealistic-Platonic or empirical 
framework could not have given rise to such a constructivist conception. Rather 
it emerged from the ashes of  the Aristotelian tradition that recognized forms as 
constituent of  matter.52 It is the Aristotelian mathematicians like Tartaglia, who 
laid the foundations of  the “modern concepts of  scientific experiment, whether 
ideal or real, of  a proof, which, in valorizing the activity of  mathematical rea-
soning in the establishment of  the objective fact, seeks […] to reproduce, or to 
imagine, the conditions of  observability, which, if  approximated to the ideal, are 
suitable to test the mathematical law.” 53 Only an eclectic Aristotelian like Tart-
cellor has never explicitly stated the theory of  maker’s knowledge. Cf. A. Pérez-Ramos, Francis 
Bacon’s Idea of  Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1988, p. 92.
49 Cf. P. Dear, Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution, 
Chicago, University of  Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 8-9.
50 A. Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seven-
teenth Century, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 178.
51 Ibid., p. 12.
52 Cf. D. Sepkoski, Nominalism and Constructivism in Seventeenth-Century Mathematical Phi-
losophy, London-New York, Routledge, 2007.
53 Cf. A. De Pace, Le matematiche e il mondo. Ricerche su un dibattito in Italia nella seconda 
metà del Cinquecento, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1993, pp. 260-261. 
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aglia could affirm that “in natural events we know matter, the description, the 
quality and the quantity of  every geometrical figure” 54 and that “all those things 
that are known as true in the mind, and are highest by demonstration abstracted 
by every matter, reasonably should happen also at the sight of  matter (otherwise 
mathematics would be completely vain, of  no benefit, that is profit for the human 
being).” 55
The theoretical moment is always conjoined with the practical moment, so, 
Wootton writes, “science is an interactive process between theory on the one hand 
and observation (our old friend ‘experience’) on the other,” 56 which is nothing oth-
er than what all “Aristotelian mechanics” continuously repeated. Guidobaldo Del 
Monte, for instance, stated that “it is very certain that practice and theory are 
always conjoined, and do not differ one from the other; and moreover I can say 
that demonstration taught me how to have experiences [in the sense of  doing 
experiments].” 57 Theory and experience are thought of  together, and theory, by 
means of  hypothesis, can be an initial guide for the experiment which can validate 
or confute the theoretical presuppositions of  the hypothesis itself. Through this 
fruitful dialogue, made possible also thanks to the mathematization of  the world, 
mathematical theories were not only conceptual systems for making predictions, 
but also explanations, of  course not of  the essences of  things (what Wootton calls 
the “why”), but at least of  some of  their properties, in the partial equivalence of  
the mathematical factum with the things created by God. This kind of  mathemat-
ical knowledge is not in contrast to the Aristotelian scientia, as Wootton seems 
to suggest,58 but rather mathematicians like Pietro Catena stated that they were 
compatible and constituted different standpoints on the same knowledge. An ex-
planation, even if  quantitative and not qualitative, of  the how is always an expla-
nation of  a thing. 
The question at stake here is not the break between the old Aristotelian con-
ception, which should have explained the why, and the new scientific conception, 
which explained only the how, as Wootton asserts, because Aristotelians them-
selves had already exploited this distinction. Indeed, it is not true that the how 
does not provide causal explanations, rather, knowledge of  the how explains how 
the fact is a factum, that is how a thing happens or is generated, in quite a different 
way from the explanation of  the why, which concerns the essence. The central 
problem is rather why the explanation of  the how superseded that of  the why. 
It became more important because by means of  the knowledge of  the how ex-
54 N. Tartaglia, Euclide megarense philosopho: solo introduttore delle scientie mathematice, dili-
gentemente reassettato, et alla integrità ridotto, Venice, Ruffinelli, 1543, p. 3v.
55 N. Tartaglia, Quesiti, et inventioni diverse, Venice, Bescarini, 1554, p. 77v. Cf. A. De Pace, 
Le matematiche e il mondo, cit., pp. 187-260.
56 W, 394.
57 A. Favaro, Due lettere inedite di Guidobaldo del Monte a Giacomo Contarini, «Atti dell’Istitu-
to Veneto di Scienze, Lettere, e Arti», 59, 1899-1900, p. 307.
58 W, 393.
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amined by the mathematics and mechanics, human beings could control nature, 
while with the mere contemplation of  the essence supported by Platonics this was 
not possible.
3. Vulgarizing Knowledge and Linguistic Concerns
Wootton emphasizes that the strict connection between the fact and the ex-
periment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the instatement of  modern 
science. There are two other essential conditions so that a knowledge can prop-
erly be called scientific: 1) the possibility of  its communication; 2) the existence 
of  community capable of  understanding it. Wootton makes no secret of  taking 
Robert K. Merton and Elizabeth L. Eisenstein’s theses to the extreme. Merton’s 
central claim is that scientific knowledge is always a public knowledge, because 
only publicity allows to question, test and dispute all the new information coming 
from all over the world.59 Eisenstein’s thesis, on the other hand, states that the 
printing press is what makes this publicity possible. Printed books, full of  reliable 
and identical illustrations, improved access to information, making it easier “to 
establish and refute facts” and to replicate experiments.60 
Wootton’s claim is even stronger, however. What made the Scientific Revolu-
tion possible was the printing press because (1) it “turned private information into 
public knowledge, private experience into communal experience” and because (2) 
it constituted the transcendental condition of  the fact. There could be no fact, or 
at least no fact could be established without a public statement of  its existence. 
Wootton does not aim to diminish the achievements of  those who make discover-
ies but never make them public,61 rather he establishes that a knowledge, in order 
to be such, must be shared, otherwise it cannot lead to a progress,62 not even in 
the restricted community where it is meant to be received. At the same time, 
without a community, no public knowledge can be tested or refuted, thus no ex-
periment is possible. Scientific community and publicity of  knowledge represent 
at the same time the conditions for the new science and its main features.
The public character of  knowledge thus became a value, its secrecy a disvalue. 
In order to explain how the public character of  knowledge impacts on science, 
Wootton highlights the discontinuity between alchemy and chemistry, which the 
scholarship is apt to view as a prosecution from the latter to the former. Accord-
ing to Wootton, no continuity is possible because the manner of  understanding 
knowledge is so different. Even if  both can be considered experimental sciences, 
the alchemic art “pursued a secret learning, convinced that only a few are fit to 
59 W, 96.
60 W, 282.
61 W, 96.
62 W, 340.
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have knowledge of  divine secrets,” while chemistry was a modern science because 
it made knowledge public and had a community capable of  testing experiments. 
Therefore, it is not the experiment to distinguish the old from the new science, 
but the publicity of  knowledge and the existence of  a community.63 
It is the desire to make knowledge public to the greatest number of  people 
and to create and expand the community that led to the adoption of  new terms 
for explaining new things and the instatement of  the vernacular languages in sci-
ence. Hence we are back to Wootton’s main thesis, which focuses on language. 
What is missing in his reconstruction is not only a clear demarcation between 
the history of  terms and the history of  concepts, but a reflection on language 
itself. Language is a starting point, but it is soon abandoned. In spite of  a brief  
mention of  William Gilbert and the use of  new words to designate and to unveil 
new things, Wootton does not examine the relationship between new and the old 
languages, the progress of  knowledge and the dissemination of  scientific ideas. 
Nevertheless, it had to be a central element of  his reconstruction if  f rom language 
one has to find a revolution in mentality. 
As Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis has suggested, with the continuous advancements 
of  science and technology and the progressive accumulation of  knowledge, new 
notions were born that intellectuals “preferred to express in the vernacular, which 
as a living language developed alongside the scientific research, rather than forcing 
the Latin to express thoughts that never were the subject of  treatment.” 64 Now, 
if  it is f rom language that one recognizes revolutions, nothing was more revolu-
tionary than the vulgarization of  the ancient wisdom and the production of  new 
knowledge in the vernacular so that the greatest number of  people could have 
access to new ideas, make new hypotheses, establish new facts and replicate ex-
periments. There are a number of  statements of  philosophers and scientists to the 
effect that new knowledge follows a new language and vice versa. For instance the 
Aristotelian Alessandro Piccolomini was obsessed by the problem of  using a liv-
ing, vernacular language capable of  changing with the progress of  knowledge and 
knew that only by coining new words to designate new discoveries it was possible 
to contribute to the progress of  knowledge, which, otherwise, would be inhibit-
ed.65 The use of  the vernacular made “accessible scientific works to all classes of  
population,” “stimulating not only an interest in science, but also the mobilization 
of  all the forces that contribute to progress.” 66 
Wootton’s perspective in looking at knowledge and science from a linguistic 
standpoint is thus fruitful. To look for perfection and completeness in a study like 
this is a futile exercise. The strength of  a book does not depend exclusively on 
63 W, 360.
64 E. J. Dijksterhuis, De Mechanisering van het Wereldbeeld, Amsterdam, Amsterdam Aca-
demic Archive, 1998, p. 269.
65 A. Piccolomini, La prima parte della filosofia naturale, Rome, Valgrisi, 1551, p. 1b r-v.
66 E. J. Dijksterhuis, De Mechanisering van het Wereldbeeld, cit., p. 270.
345Renaissance aristotelianism and the scientific revolution
this, but also, and perhaps above all, on what makes you think and how many new 
threads of  research it opens up. Wootton’s book accomplishes both these tasks, 
much to its credit. One can praise or disagree with his constructivist approach, 
one can glorify or denigrate his attacks on the relativist methodology, but the only 
thing one cannot do is ignore this original and seminal book, which sets a new 
tone in the discussion of  the alleged “Scientific Revolution.”
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